Liverpool's Attack Stalled as Fulham Disrupted Their Connections

Liverpool's 0–0 draw with Fulham was less about a lack of possession than a lack of attacking connection. Fulham's organised 4-2-3-1 restricted Liverpool's ability to connect their midfield and front four cleanly, while Liverpool's delayed pressing allowed Fulham to threaten in transition. Even after second-half adjustments improved Liverpool's structure, the home side never generated enough consistent final-third quality to turn territorial pressure into a goal.

Executive Summary

Liverpool controlled more of the ball and produced the larger expected-goals total, but their attacking structure lacked the fluency required to break Fulham's organisation.

Fulham defended with a compact 4-2-3-1 and were particularly effective through the central positioning of their midfield and attacking line. Liverpool struggled to connect Florian Wirtz, Alexander Isak and their wide players, while their first-half pressing was also too slow to prevent Fulham from progressing into dangerous areas.

Iraola's second-half changes improved Liverpool's structure. Milos Kerkez provided greater width from left-back, allowing Bradley Barcola to move inside, while Alexis Mac Allister and Cody Gakpo increased Liverpool's attacking quality. But the improvement produced pressure rather than sustained penetration.

Match Context

Liverpool and Fulham drew 0–0 at Anfield on Saturday, 12 September 2026.

Liverpool entered the match only three days after their Champions League victory over Atlético Madrid. Iraola made three changes to his starting XI, bringing in Kostas Tsimikas, Ryan Gravenberch and Víctor Muñoz.

Fulham arrived at Anfield having lost their opening three league matches under Álvaro Arbeloa, but produced a disciplined performance to earn their first point of the season.

Liverpool remained unbeaten under Iraola, but the draw represented their third stalemate in four Premier League matches.

Tactical Setup

Liverpool started from a 4-2-3-1.

Alisson was protected by Ronald Araújo, Jérémy Jacquet, Virgil van Dijk and Kostas Tsimikas. Ryan Gravenberch and Dominik Szoboszlai formed the midfield base, with Víctor Muñoz and Bradley Barcola providing width around Florian Wirtz. Alexander Isak operated as the central striker.

The intended attacking structure relied on the front four creating changing relationships around Fulham's defensive block.

Fulham also used a 4-2-3-1.

The double pivot protected the centre, while Josh King operated between Liverpool's midfield and defensive lines. Oscar Bobb and Alex Iwobi could narrow when necessary, allowing Fulham to protect central spaces while retaining outlets for transitions.

The important feature was therefore not simply that both teams had the same nominal formation. It was how Fulham used theirs to remain compact centrally without completely surrendering their ability to counter.

Key Tactical Battle

Fulham disrupted Liverpool's attacking connections

Liverpool's primary difficulty was connecting their attacking players consistently.

Barcola, Muñoz, Wirtz and Isak often occupied related attacking zones without generating enough coordinated movement to disorganise Fulham. Liverpool could move the ball into advanced areas, but the next action was frequently predictable, allowing Fulham to maintain their defensive distances rather than being forced into repeated emergency movements.

When a wide player moved inside, the full-back did not always provide the necessary outside threat quickly enough. When Wirtz moved between the lines, Fulham could often maintain enough players around the zone to prevent the reception from becoming immediately dangerous.

Liverpool therefore had to choose between playing through Fulham's central protection or moving the ball wide and trying to create an advantage from there. Neither route consistently produced enough penetration.

Fulham's compactness also shaped Liverpool's pressing problem

Iraola identified Liverpool's first-half pressing as a problem, saying his players were "arriving late to the presses."

That matters because Liverpool's attacking and defensive phases were connected. If Liverpool could not regain the ball high enough, Fulham could progress further before Liverpool's defensive block was established. This increased the distance Liverpool had to cover before attacking again and reduced the number of possessions they could begin in the final third.

The problem was therefore not simply a lack of pressing intensity. It was a lack of synchronisation.

A clear example came when Liverpool attempted to play out from the back. Alisson's pass placed Gravenberch under pressure inside the penalty area, allowing Fulham to attack the resulting turnover. Josh King became involved around the area before Gonzalo García's subsequent effort was cleared off the line by Jérémy Jacquet.

The sequence did not produce a goal, but it illustrated the risk of Liverpool's build-up against a Fulham side willing to press specific moments rather than constantly chase the ball.

Fulham attacked the spaces Liverpool left behind

Fulham did not need to defend every Liverpool possession aggressively. They could maintain their shape and wait for Liverpool to attempt the next pass into a crowded area.

When Liverpool's circulation slowed, Fulham's distances became easier to preserve. When Liverpool lost the ball, Fulham could then attack the spaces created by Liverpool's advanced positioning.

King became particularly important in this phase. His positioning between Liverpool's lines gave Fulham a route forward, while Bobb and Iwobi provided supporting outlets.

Liverpool's clearest first-half chance came from a different route: Víctor Muñoz's header struck the crossbar from a Dominik Szoboszlai corner. The chance highlighted how Liverpool's set-piece delivery became an important alternative source of penalty-area access when open-play connections were difficult to establish.

Liverpool controlled more of the territory, but Fulham remained competitive because Liverpool rarely turned that territorial advantage into consistently dangerous situations.

Important Adjustments

Kerkez provides width and Barcola moves inside

Iraola changed the structure at half-time by replacing Tsimikas with Milos Kerkez.

The tactical consequence was important. Kerkez could provide greater width from the left, allowing Barcola to move into more central or inside-left areas.

This gave Liverpool a different relationship between full-back and winger. Barcola could attack inside while Liverpool retained an outside option, giving the team more variation in the point of attack.

The change did not transform the match immediately, but it improved Liverpool's ability to vary their attacking structure.

Mac Allister and Gakpo increase attacking quality

At the hour mark, Alexis Mac Allister and Cody Gakpo replaced Ryan Gravenberch and Víctor Muñoz.

The changes gave Liverpool greater technical quality in possession and more varied attacking movement. Mac Allister immediately became involved in a promising sequence with Szoboszlai before his powerful strike was saved by Leno.

Gakpo also gave Liverpool another player capable of occupying defenders centrally and connecting with the surrounding attackers.

Liverpool subsequently generated more pressure, but Fulham remained capable of defending the box and attacking on transition.

Effect — Liverpool improved without fully solving the problem

Iraola felt Liverpool controlled the second half better after improving their structure.

The difference was visible. Liverpool created better moments through Isak, Mac Allister, Szoboszlai and Barcola, while their defensive pressing also became more coherent.

But the improvement was incremental rather than transformational.

Liverpool became more threatening. They did not become consistently dominant.

Key Player: Josh King

Josh King was one of Fulham's most important tactical players because of the spaces he occupied rather than simply his shot volume.

Operating as the attacking midfielder in Fulham's 4-2-3-1, King provided a link between the midfield base and the forward line.

That gave Fulham an outlet whenever Liverpool's full-backs and midfielders pushed forward. He also demonstrated the ability to threaten Liverpool's defensive line after transitions.

King had two attempts in the first half and later forced a strong save from Alisson.

His positioning helped Fulham avoid becoming a purely reactive side. Rather than defending with ten players behind the ball, Fulham retained a player capable of receiving or attacking space when possession changed.

What Could Have Changed?

Liverpool's most credible route to a different result was greater variation in their attacking connections.

Simply increasing possession would not have solved the problem. Liverpool needed to create more uncertainty for Fulham's midfield and defensive line.

One route was:

full-back width → winger inside → striker movement → midfield arrival

The reverse could also create variation:

winger holding width → full-back underlap/overlap → interior player attacks the next line

The Kerkez-Barcola adjustment moved Liverpool closer to this principle because it gave Barcola more freedom to move inside without completely surrendering width.

Wider Implications

For Liverpool, the match highlighted an important developmental issue under Iraola.

The team can produce attacking momentum when its pressing, circulation and positional movements are synchronised. But when those elements lose connection, the attacking structure becomes easier to defend.

Liverpool's next step is therefore not simply more attacking talent. It is better coordination between press → recovery → possession → positional rotations → final-third access.

For Fulham, the result provides an important reference point for Arbeloa's developing side. They did not need to dominate possession to compete: their 4-2-3-1 provided enough central protection to frustrate Liverpool while retaining attacking outlets through King, Bobb and Iwobi.

Conclusion

Liverpool's 0–0 draw with Fulham was a tactical reminder that possession and attacking control are not the same thing.

Liverpool had enough of the ball to control territory, but Fulham's compact 4-2-3-1 repeatedly disrupted the connections Liverpool needed to penetrate centrally or create clean final-third situations.

Iraola's second-half adjustments improved the structure. Kerkez restored greater width, Barcola gained more freedom inside, and the introduction of Mac Allister and Gakpo increased Liverpool's technical quality.

Yet the changes produced pressure rather than a sustained attacking breakthrough.

Fulham's defensive organisation, combined with their willingness to attack transition spaces, ensured that Liverpool's territorial advantage never became decisive.

TGO Analyst View

Liverpool's 0–0 draw with Fulham was ultimately a problem of connection rather than possession.

Liverpool had more of the ball, more shots and the higher expected-goals figure. But Fulham's compact 4-2-3-1 disrupted the relationships Liverpool needed to turn possession into sustained final-third penetration.

The problem was compounded by Liverpool's first-half pressing.

As Iraola acknowledged, Liverpool were arriving late to their presses, allowing Fulham to progress further and reducing the number of high recoveries Liverpool could use to attack an unsettled opponent.

Liverpool improved after half-time.

Kerkez restored greater width, allowing Barcola to move inside. Mac Allister and Gakpo added technical quality and movement. Liverpool created more pressure and better chances.

But Fulham's structure survived.

The match therefore provides a more useful lesson than simply saying Liverpool were tired or Fulham defended well.

Liverpool had enough possession to control the territory, but not enough coordinated movement to consistently control the spaces within it.

For Iraola, the next step is to make the relationships between the full-backs, wingers, midfielders and front line more automatic — particularly when opponents can maintain a compact central block.